The Malian junta wants you to believe it's winning the war in the north. Don't buy the propaganda. The latest announcement from state television tells a completely different story.
Mali's army chief, General Jean Elysee Dao, finally admitted that around 30 Malian soldiers were killed and another 60 wounded during the operation to retake the northern town of Anefis. Let's be clear about what this means. Anefis isn't a massive metropolis; it's a strategic stepping stone located roughly 100 kilometers from Kidal. Losing 30 troops just to kick rebels out of a single town isn't a victory. It's a bloody warning sign that the state is bleeding out in the desert.
If you want to understand why Mali's security strategy is collapsing, you have to look at how Anefis fell in the first place and who the army is actually fighting.
The Coordinated Assault That Caught Bamako Napping
On July 4, Tuareg separatists under the banner of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) teamed up with fighters from Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an affiliate of al-Qaeda. They didn't just launch a minor raid. They hit multiple army positions across the country simultaneously.
Anefis fell almost immediately. The army spent nearly a week scrambling to put together a resupply convoy, backed by Russian paramilitaries from the Africa Corps, just to march back into town. By the time the military claimed they had restored control, the damage was done.
The FLA didn't mince words about the encounter. They acknowledged losing some of their own top fighters, but claimed they inflicted the heaviest material and human losses on the Malian army and its Russian allies in the history of the region. Given Dao's admission of 90 total casualties, the rebel claims don't sound like empty boasting.
Why the FLA and JNIM Partnership Changes Everything
Historically, Tuareg nationalists and radical Islamists don't get along. They have different goals. The FLA wants an independent state called Azawad in northern Mali. JNIM wants a hardline Islamic state spanning the entire Sahel.
But right now, they share a common enemy: the military government in Bamako and their Russian shadow army.
We saw this exact same deadly cooperation earlier this year in late April. Coordinated attacks across the country managed to kill Mali's Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, and briefly blockaded the capital city of Bamako by setting fire to food trucks. When these two factions stop fighting each other and point their guns at the state, the Malian army simply doesn't have the manpower or the tactical capability to hold them off.
The Russian Africa Corps is Failing Its Only Job
When Mali's military junta kicked out French forces and UN peacekeepers, they promised that Russian mercenary groups would fix the country's security issues. First came Wagner, then rebranded as the Africa Corps under direct Russian state control.
The reality? The Russians are getting slaughtered alongside local Malian troops. During the battle for Anefis, rebel forces claimed to have shot down two Russian helicopters and destroyed an entire reinforcement convoy. The Africa Corps relies on heavy-handed tactics, including drone strikes that frequently hit civilians—like a wedding party in May that left ten dead—which only serves to drive more local recruits into the arms of the rebels.
If Bamako can't secure a vital corridor like the Gao-Kidal highway without losing dozens of men and millions of dollars in hardware, they can't protect the country's massive gold, lithium, and uranium reserves in the south.
What Happens Next in the Sahel
If you're watching the West African region, expect the security situation to get worse before it gets any better. The loss of life in Anefis proves that fixed military bases in northern Mali are currently sitting ducks.
For the international community, the focus must shift toward watching regional spillovers into neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso, which are dealing with identical junta-led security failures. For analysts and observers, stop looking at government press releases for signs of stability. Watch the logistical supply lines. If the Malian army cannot keep the roads between Gao and Kidal open without suffering unsustainable casualties, the northern half of the country will effectively belong to the rebels by the end of the year.
